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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an action movie in which you are the target of a 
secret government operation. Helicopters fly overhead and 
sirens blare in the background. The police are ready to knock 
down the door and conduct a raid of your home. What is the 
reason for the raid? The government has covertly conducted 
surveillance of your every move and is preparing to arrest you 
for crimes based on this information. 
On January 20, 2012, this was the reality for Kim Dotcom 
when seventy-six New Zealand police officers, some equipped 
with machine guns and arriving by helicopter, raided his home 
in connection to piracy and money-laundering allegations.1 
Dotcom is the founder of Megaupload.com, a website 
considered a piracy hub that allowed users to upload files 
illegally.2 Prior to the raid on Dotcom’s home, the New Zealand 
Government Communications Security Bureau (“GCSB”) had 
illegally spied on Dotcom and his associates, all residents and 
                                                                                                                                     
1. See Duncan Grieve, Kim Dotcom: “I’m Not A Pirate, I’m an Innovator”, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.) (Jan. 14, 2014, 12:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/
jan/14/kim-dotcom-megaupload-pirate-innovator-dance-album-interview (providing 
details about the raid on Dotcom’s home); see also Kim Dotcom Raid Video Shows 
Helicopters, Police Vans Used in Arrest of Megaupload Founder, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 
2012, 10:56 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/09/kim-dotcom-raid-
video-megaupload_n_1758317.html (describing the night of Kim Dotcom’s arrest). 
2. See Erich Schwartzel, U.S. Lays Out Case Against Megaupload, Kim Dotcom, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2013, 7:05 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527
02304773104579270710061412756 (describing what Megaupload is and the charges 
against Kim Dotcom); see also Grieve, supra note 1 (describing Megaupload as a piracy 
hub). 
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citizens of New Zealand.3 As a result of this scandal, New 
Zealand enacted amendments to the Government 
Communications Security Bureau Act, which overtly regulates 
how the GSCB may conduct surveillance of New Zealand 
citizens.4 
New Zealand is not the only country that is experiencing 
backlash due to its surveillance efforts.5 In the United States, 
government officials have faced similar scrutiny in the wake of 
Edward Snowden’s public revelations regarding national security 
and international surveillance as they implicate privacy rights.6 
On June 5, 2013, Snowden, a former worker for the US National 
Security Agency (“NSA”), provided the Guardian with classified 
documents about the NSA’s abilities, such as the ability to target 
individuals ranging from “you or your accountant, to a federal 
judge, to even the President.”7 These documents sparked heated 
                                                                                                                                     
3. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Extradition for Mr. Dotcom in N. Zealand Caught in 
Controversies, 28 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 450 (2012) (explaining that the New 
Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (“GCSB”) illegally spied on 
Mr. Dotcom); see also New Zealand Extends Domestic Spying Powers, BBC (Aug. 21, 2013, 
6:49 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23769206 (describing the allegations 
made against Kim Dotcom and his associates); Rebecca Quilliam, GCSB Spying Illegal, 
but No Charges Laid, N.Z. HERALD (Aug. 29, 2013, 6:49 PM), http://
www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11116460) (stating that no 
charges were pursued against the GCSB because criminal intent did not exist). 
4. See New Zealand Spying Law Passes Allowing Surveillance on Citizens, AGENCE FR. 
PRESSE (Aug. 21, 2013, 9:50 AM), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
08/21/new-zealand-spying-law_n_3789041.html (describing the passage of the new 
surveillance law following this scandal); see also Government Communications Security 
Bureau Amendment Act 2013 (N.Z.) (describing the newest version of the GCSB Act’s 
additions including the specific mention of citizenship). 
5. See Brett Logiurato, Edward Snowden Is in the Process of Destroying Any Support and 
Sympathy He Has Built Up, BUS. INSIDER (June 17, 2013, 12:57 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/edward-snowden-backlash-nsa-spying-china-2013-6 (stating 
that since former NSA worker Edward Snowden’s disclosures, there has been a steady 
backlash against the United States); see also Michael Shepard, Obama Plans to Name Navy 
Vice Admiral Rogers as Next NSA Chief, BUS. WK. (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-31/obama-plans-to-name-navy-vice-
admiral-rogers-as-next-nsa-chief (noting the international backlash that the United 
States is facing). 
6. See Loguirato, supra note 5; Shepard, supra note 5 (describing the actions of 
Edward Snowden and the resulting backlash). 
7. See Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA 
Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (London), June 9, 2013, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-
surveillance (describing who Edward Snowden is and what he did); see also Carol D. 
Leonnig et al., Tracking Edward Snowden, from a Maryland Classroom to a Hong Kong Hotel, 
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debate in the United States about the protection of the right to 
privacy.8 Today, the balance between the right to privacy and the 
power of government to engage in surveillance is at the heart of 
this important debate.9 
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks in the 
United States, the London subway bombings in the United 
Kingdom, and other atrocities, democratic states across the 
world have invested heavily in surveillance technologies.10 
Concerns relating to privacy violations, however, are at some of 
the highest levels in history.11 Commentators on the state of 
surveillance law have stated that if members of the public 
understood the magnitude of surveillance, they would believe 
                                                                                                                                     
WASH. POST, June 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
tracking-edward-snowden-from-a-maryland-classroom-to-a-hong-kong-hotel/2013/06/
15/420aedd8-d44d-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html (providing a short biography of 
Edward Snowden’s life and actions); Joe Weisenthal & Paul Szoldra, 29-Year Old NSA 
Whistleblower Makes Mindblowing Claims About the Power He Had, BUS. WK. (June 9, 2013, 
3:14 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/edward-snowden-nsa-2013-
6#ixzz2sTqpQ894 (recounting the exact revelations made by Snowden). 
8. See Christopher Swift, Privacy Protections and the Surveillance State: Bridging the 
Transatlantic Divide, 19 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 75 (2013) (noting Edward Snowden 
disclosed information about classified programs to the Guardian); see also Frank Jordans 
& Raphael Satter, Growing Backlash to Government Surveillance, N.Z. HERALD (Oct. 13, 
2013), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11139434 
(discussing the idea that before Edward Snowden’s revelation this past summer that 
many people did not know what the NSA was doing or what it was). 
9. See Darla W. Jackson, Protection of Privacy in the Search and Seizure of E-Mail: Is the 
United States Doomed to an Orwellian Future?, 17 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 97 (1999) 
(noting the delicate balance between individual rights and the need for information); 
see also Alex Conte, A Clash of Wills: Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, 20 N.Z. U. L. 
REV. 338, 339 (2003) (describing the debate surrounding counterterrorism and the 
protection of individual rights). 
10. See Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1938 
(2013) (describing what has occurred in surveillance law as a result of these events); see 
also Kevin J. Lawner, Post-Sept. 11th International Surveillance Activity—A Failure of 
Intelligence: The Echelon Interception System & the Fundamental Right to Privacy in Europe, 
14 PACE INT’L L. REV. 435, 439 (2002) (discussing how experts agree that surveillance is 
necessary in the post-9/11 era). 
11. See David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An 
International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 4 (1999) (noting that surveys show an 
increasing concern for privacy); see also Poll: American Public’s Concerns over Surveillance 
Programs and Privacy Erosion, FOX NEWS (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/
us/2013/09/10/poll-american-public-concerns-rise-over-surveillance-programs-and-
privacy/ (reviewing the poll results and concluding that Americans do not think that 
their privacy is protected). 
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that these actions infringe upon their privacy rights.12 With the 
Kim Dotcom scandal and the Edward Snowden revelations, 
citizens of the New Zealand and the United States, and the 
international population at large, have become more aware of 
the potential privacy violations posed by state surveillance 
efforts.13 
While the potential privacy violations are at the forefront of 
public discussion in both the United States and New Zealand, 
the two countries regulate the surveillance of citizens 
differently.14 The United States cannot obtain warrants to 
conduct surveillance on individuals; however, loopholes in 
current surveillance law indicate that this requirement can be 
circumvented.15 Alternatively, New Zealand’s amendments to the 
Government Communications Security Bureau Act (the “GCSB 
Act”) reveal that the country publicly admits to conducting 
surveillance of its citizens.16 The question is whether either 
approach effectively strikes the appropriate balance between 
privacy and national security. 
This Note compares the surveillance laws in the United 
States and New Zealand in order to demonstrate that a warrant 
requirement is not sufficient to protect the right to privacy and 
curb government spying. Part I of this Note will discuss the 
history of privacy and surveillance law in the United States and 
in New Zealand. Part I will also review the right to privacy 
internationally and the breadth of international surveillance 
agencies. Part II will compare surveillance law in the United 
States with the recently enacted amendments to New Zealand 
                                                                                                                                     
12. See Erin L. Brown, Echelon: The National Security Agency’s Compliance with 
Applicable Legal Guidelines in Light of the Need for Tighter National Security, 11 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 185, 198 (2003) (stating that if people were aware of the scope of 
surveillance their thoughts would change about the state of their privacy rights). See 
generally Poll: American Public’s Concerns over Surveillance Programs and Privacy Erosion, 
supra note 11 (describing how Americans felt about surveillance after the scope of 
American spying was publicly revealed by Edward Snowden). 
13. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (surveying the problems that New 
Zealand and the United States have faced because of the Kim Dotcom and Edward 
Snowden scandals). 
14. See infra Part 1.B–.C (describing how the United States and New Zealand have 
developed their surveillance and privacy law). 
15. See infra Part I.B.3 (outlining the provisions of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) that prohibit the Government from spying on US citizens). 
16. See infra Part I.C.3 (providing an overview of the GCSB Act amendments that 
allow New Zealand to spy on its citizens). 
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law. Part II will also analyze the impact of New Zealand’s new law 
on its citizens. Finally, Part III will provide an overview of 
proposed solutions for the international surveillance landscape. 
Part III will also argue that despite their different articulations of 
surveillance policy, the United States and New Zealand have 
similar problems with their surveillance laws that are not easily 
fixed. 
I. PRIVACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND 
Part I provides background information on the concept of 
the right to privacy generally, as well as how this right is treated 
in the United States and in New Zealand. Part 1.A. gives a 
general introduction to the right to privacy. Part 1.A.1 narrows 
this introduction, providing an overview of the right to privacy 
internationally. Part I.B outlines the extensive background of 
the right to privacy and surveillance law in the United States. 
Part I.C explains the development of privacy and surveillance 
law in New Zealand. Lastly, Part I.D provides an overview of 
Echelon, an NSA-operated secret international surveillance 
program changing the face of international surveillance.17  
A. The Right to Privacy 
Though privacy is central to many contemporary concerns, 
it remains an elusive concept.18 The modern concept of privacy 
grew out of the idea that there is a difference between how 
people present themselves in public and what they do in their 
private lives, a difference that allows for a certain level of 
                                                                                                                                     
17. Brown, supra note 12, at 185 (describing Echelon as NSA-operated); Lawner, 
supra note 10, at 352 (stating that Echelon is implemented by NSA). See generally Matt 
Bedan, Echelon’s Effect: The Obsolescence of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Legal Regime, 59 
FED. COMM. L.J. 425 (2007) (providing an extensive review of Echelon); Lawrence D. 
Sloan, Echelon and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation, 50 
DUKE L.J. 1467 (2001) (outlining the background of Echelon). 
18. See Lisa Tat, Plaintiff Culpability and the New Zealand Tort of Invasion of Privacy, 
39 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 365 (2008) (noting that there is no universally 
accepted definition of privacy); David Lindsay, An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of 
Privacy and the Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 
131, 135 (2005) (noting that privacy is an “elusive” concept and cannot be defined in a 
satisfactory manner). 
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autonomy in the private setting.19 Although the concept of 
privacy is well known, throughout legal literature there is almost 
a “complete absence” of agreement as to the correct definition 
of privacy, as well as to the values that should be emphasized in 
its protection.20 The concept of privacy may be so “complex and 
value-laden” that arguments about it cannot be easily resolved.21 
1. Right to Privacy: Brief International Perspective 
The United Nations formally declared privacy a 
fundamental right in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.22 Further, Article 17 of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) protects the 
right to privacy against arbitrary or unlawful interference, and 
considers it a vital international civil right.23 The ICCPR has an 
Optional Protocol, which allows the Human Rights Committee 
established in the ICCPR to review allegations of privacy rights 
                                                                                                                                     
19. See Megan Vettoretti & Gehan Gunasekara, Ministerial Free Speech and the 
Privacy Act, 17 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 284, 287 (2011) (explaining the private and public divide 
creating the necessity for privacy); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397 (1978) 
(discussing the fact that the US Supreme Court’s decisions have recognized a 
guarantee to privacy and autonomy); Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: 
Empirically Measuring “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 
38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 295, 319 (2011) (describing the relation of the right to privacy 
and autonomy or the right to be left alone). 
20. See Lindsay, supra note 18, at 135 (reviewing the “daunting literature” 
surrounding the debate on privacy); see also Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002) (noting that the “horde” of literature has produced 
many conceptions of privacy). 
21. See Lindsay, supra note 18, at 137 (noting that the definition of privacy is 
contested and debates cannot be rationally resolved); see also Solove, supra note 20, at 
1089 (stating that privacy is a complex value). 
22. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 12, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating formally a right to privacy); see Ariel E. 
Wade, A New Age of Privacy Protection: A Proposal for an International Personal Data Privacy 
Treaty, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 659, 660 (2010) (describing the United Nations’ 
affirmative declaration of a right to privacy). 
23. See International Covenant on Article of Civil and Political Rights art. 17, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing all 
members a right to privacy against arbitrary intrusion); see also Lawner, supra note 10, at 
465 (discussing the right to privacy established in this convention); Lauren H. Rakower, 
Blurred Line: Zooming in on Google Street View and the Global Right to Privacy, 37 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 317, 337 (2011) (noting that the right to privacy is found in Article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)). 
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violations in signatory countries.24 Although the US Senate 
approved the treaty for ratification in 1992, the United States 
has neither signed nor ratified the Optional Protocol, meaning 
that US citizens cannot appeal under the protections of this 
convention if privacy rights have been breached.25 New Zealand, 
on the other hand, has not only ratified the ICCPR, but also 
ratified the Optional Protocol on May 26, 1989.26 
In addition to the United Nations, the European Union has 
also recognized privacy as a fundamental right.27 Article 7 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union protects 
the privacy of the home and family, and Article 8 provides for 
protection of personal data.28 Furthermore, the 
Telecommunications Directive and the Data Protection 
Directive set guidelines for privacy protection by reinforcing 
data protection laws and establishing a range of new privacy 
rights.29 Specifically, the Telecommunications Directive provides 
                                                                                                                                     
24. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Introduction, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (stating that 
this Optional Protocol establishes a means to appeal to the Human Rights Committee 
established by the ICCPR); see also Lawner, supra note 10, at 465 (discussing the ICCPR 
provisions pertaining to the right to privacy); David Sloss, Using International Law to 
Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 19 n.83 (2006) (mentioning the existence of the 
Optional Protocol). 
25. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supra note 24 (failing to list the United States as a signatory); see also Lawner, 
supra note 10, at 465 (noting that the Optional Protocol has not been signed by the 
United States); Sloss, supra note 24, at 19 n.83 (explaining that a US citizen may not file 
a complaint because the United States has not signed the Optional Protocol). 
26. See ICCPR, supra note 23 (identifying the date when New Zealand ratified the 
Optional Protocol); see also Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, supra note 24 (indicating the ratification date for New Zealand). 
27. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. C 
326/391 [hereinafter Charter of Rights] (granting all members the protection of 
privacy in the home, life and communications); see also Lawner, supra note 10, at 461 
(describing EU initiatives to protect privacy); Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 12 
(explaining EU directives that provide for data protection). 
28. See Charter of Rights, supra note 27 (stating the specific rights protected 
under this Charter); see also Lawner, supra note 10, at 465 (describing the privacy 
protections implicit in this Charter). 
29. See Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
telecommunications sector art 1, 1998 O.J. L 24/1 [hereinafter Telecommunications 
Directive 97/66] (protecting the right to privacy in the telecommunications sector); 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, 1995 O.J. L 281/31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive 95/46] 
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protections for telephone, mobile, and other 
telecommunication networks.30 The Data Protection Directive 
provides guidelines for the processing of personal data.31 
Furthermore, the Treaty of the European Union ensures 
that the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
protects European Union members.32 Article 8 of the ECHR 
provides for the right to privacy in the home and family life.33 
The European Court of Human Rights has construed this right 
broadly when used to protect the collection of information 
related to the private life.34 The European Court of Human 
Rights reviews Member States’ laws and can impose sanctions for 
the failure to regulate wiretapping or other modes of 
surveillance.35 
B. Privacy and Surveillance in the United States 
Overall, the United States does not have an overarching 
privacy law and instead uses a “piecemeal” approach, relying on 
                                                                                                                                     
(providing protection of all personal information); Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 
13 (describing how these directives operate to protect private information); Jennifer 
Morris, Big Success or "Big Brother?": Great Britain's National Identification Scheme Before the 
European Court of Human Rights, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443, 453 (2008) (discussing 
the parameters of this data protection directive). 
30. See Telecommunications Directive 97/66, supra note 29, art. 2 (explaining that 
the act exempts radio and television); Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 12 
(explaining the purpose of the Telecommunications Directive). 
31. See Data Protection Directive 95/46, supra note 29, art. 7 (describing criteria 
to legitimatize data processing); Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 12 (describing the 
role of the Data Protection Directive). 
32. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union art. 6, 2012 
O.J. C 326/13, at 19 (stating that the European Union accedes to the ECHR); Lawner, 
supra note 10, at 461 (declaring that the ECHR is binding on Member States). 
33. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (granting the right to privacy 
in the home and family life); Lawner, supra note 10, at 467 (describing the rights and 
freedoms granted in the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”)); see 
Wade, supra note 22, at 667 (explaining the ECHR and what rights the EU protects). 
34. See Morris, supra note 29, at 460 (stating that the right has been construed 
broadly); Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that Article 8 has been read 
broadly to protect private life). 
35. See, e.g., Klass and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
at 214 (1979-80) (reviewing West Germany’s laws about wiretapping); Banisar & Davies, 
supra note 11, at 9 (citing situations in which the European Court of Human Rights 
imposed sanctions); Jackson, supra note 9, at 110–11 (noting the cases where the 
European Court of Human Rights reviewed wiretapping instances and imposed 
sanctions). 
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the US Constitution, judicial decisions, legislation, and 
regulations.36 Privacy concerns in the United States were notably 
posed in a seminal 1890 article written by Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis.37 Warren and Brandeis have been labeled the 
“inventors” of the right to privacy in the United States.38 Their 
article called for legal limits on surveillance conducted by 
private parties and called for a legal recognition of the “right to 
be left alone.”39 It highlighted the importance of the right to 
privacy, which developed over time in the United States with 
advances in technology.40 
In Part I.B.1., this Note will discuss the constitutional 
protections provided in US law. Part I.B.2 discusses seminal US 
Supreme Court cases reviewing the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy as related to surveillance. Part I.B.3 provides an extensive 
overview of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) 
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”). 
Lastly, Part I.B.4 briefly discusses the NSA. 
                                                                                                                                     
36. See Richards, supra note 10, at 1942 (determining that the “law governing 
surveillance is piecemeal”); Wade, supra note 22, at 663 (acknowledging that the 
United States does not have an “overarching privacy law” and relies on a piece by piece 
method). 
37. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 197 (1890) (exploring whether there is a right to privacy in the United States 
and whether the law protected that right); Lindsay, supra note 18, at 140 (noting that 
the right to privacy evolved out of “public disclosure of private matters”). 
38. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law 
of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 125 (2007) (stating that Warren and Brandeis have 
been hailed as the “inventors” of privacy); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A 
Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703 (1990) (labeling 
Warren and Brandeis as the inventors of privacy law). 
39. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 37, at 193 (arguing that the legal rights 
have been broadened to the right to be left alone); Lindsay, supra note 18, at 140 
(describing how Warren and Brandeis discussed what legal limits were needed for 
surveillance conducted by private parties, not the state); Richards & Solove, supra note 
38, at 128 (noting that Warren and Brandeis were concerned with the press 
“‘overstepping’ their bounds”). 
40. See Lindsay, supra note 18, at 140 (arguing that privacy law develops with 
technology and Warren and Brandeis’ article directly related to this idea); Warren & 
Brandeis, supra note 37, at 195 (determining that advances like instantaneous 
photographs and newspapers have invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life). 
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1. Constitutional Protections: The Fourth Amendment 
There is no explicit constitutional right to privacy in the 
United States.41 The US Supreme Court, however, has held that 
there is a limited constitutional right to privacy based on 
provisions within the US Bill of Rights such as the First, Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.42 Notably, in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that there was an implied 
right to privacy based on the “penumbras, formed by 
emanations from the Bill of Rights’ guarantees.”43 The Court 
has found this right within the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unlawful searches and seizures.44 The Fourth 
Amendment also applies to federal government searches to 
obtain foreign intelligence and surveillance.45 
2. US Supreme Court Cases Reviewing the Right to Privacy and 
the Fourth Amendment 
The privacy principle of the Fourth Amendment, and its 
application to surveillance, has been examined in three main US 
                                                                                                                                     
41. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X (affirming many rights, but absent a grant of any 
explicit privacy right); Wade, supra note 22, at 662 (explaining that there is no explicit 
constitutional right but that the Court has found the right to be implicit in the 
Constitution); Kevin C. McAdam & John R. Webb, Privacy: A Common Law and 
Constitutional Crossroads, 40 COLO. LAW. 55, 56 (2011) (stating that there is no express 
right to privacy). 
42. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (reviewing amendments 
where the right to privacy is implicit); Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 108 (referring 
to the number of provisions within the US Constitution in which the Supreme Court 
has found a right to privacy); Wade, supra note 22, at 662 (listing provisions of the US 
Constitution where a right to privacy may be inferred). 
43. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (discussing the implied right to privacy found in 
the US Constitution); Wade, supra note 22, at 662 (explaining how the Court 
determined that there is an implied right to privacy). 
44. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding a right to privacy based 
on the Fourth Amendment “wherever a man may be”); Brown, supra note 12, at 196 
(citing the Fourth Amendment and its relevance in the US surveillance system); Jack 
Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons, Houses, 
Papers, and Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017, 
1023 (2012) (discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (granting the right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 602–03 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(applying the Fourth Amendment to the federal government’s actions); Sloan, supra 
note 17, at 1492 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is a fundamental limitation 
on intelligence gathering and its application to the federal government). 
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Supreme Court cases.46 In Olmstead v. United States, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of the government’s 
participation in electronic surveillance.47 This was one of the 
first cases to specifically review the constitutionality of 
wiretapping.48 In Olmstead, the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment did not provide protection from electronic 
surveillance.49  It construed the Fourth Amendment narrowly as 
only protecting against trespassory searches and seizures, and 
rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
could extend beyond the physical search of a limited area.50 In 
Justice Brandeis’s dissent, he postulated that the Fourth 
Amendment should not be limited to physical property, but it 
should extend to invasions of “personal security, personal liberty 
and private property.”51 This dissent aside, the US Supreme 
                                                                                                                                     
46. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (stating that the issue in 
the case was whether wiretapping of telephones was constitutional); Katz, 389 U.S. at 
359 (1967) (holding that wiretapping of telephones is unconstitutional even if reached 
from outside the home); United States v. US District Court (Kieth), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) 
(reviewing the government’s ability to conduct warrantless domestic surveillance); 
Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines 
of Intelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) 
(explaining the impact of the Olmstead, Katz and Keith cases). 
47. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438 (discussing the constitutionality of wiretapping of 
private telephones); Brown, supra note 12, at 196 (explaining that Olmstead was the first 
time that the US Supreme Court considered this problem); Copeland, supra note 46, at 
6 (stating that before Olmstead the US Supreme Court had not considered the issue of 
electronic surveillance). 
48. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455 (stating that the case reviews the constitutionality 
of wiretapping); Copeland, supra note 46, at 6 (noting that this was the first instance in 
which the US Supreme Court reviewed wiretapping). 
49. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (“We think, therefore, that the wire tapping here 
disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”); Brown, supra note 12, at 196 (discussing that the Fourth Amendment 
was not intended to protect against non-trespassory electronic surveillance); Sloan, 
supra note 17, at 1493 (noting the US Supreme Court’s holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not provide protection from electronic surveillance). 
50. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465 (“The intervening wires are not part of his house 
or office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”); Jonathan 
D. Forgang, “The Right of the People”: The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 217, 227 
(2009) (describing the Court’s holding in Olmstead as limiting the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections to physical searches of private property). 
51. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474–75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[B]ut it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private 
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public 
offense . . . .”); Forgang, supra note 50, at 227 (describing the dissent written by Justice 
Louis Brandeis). 
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Court held that the US Government did not infringe upon any 
constitutional right to privacy.52 
In 1967, the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead in Katz v. 
United States, finding wiretapping to be restricted by the privacy 
protections implicit in the Fourth Amendment.53 The Court 
found that the Fourth Amendment creates and protects a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.54 The Court went beyond the 
Fourth Amendment’s previously recognized protections and 
decided to protect those areas that are private outside the 
home.55 The Court, however, did not address whether a warrant 
was required to conduct electronic surveillance for national 
security purposes.56 This question was not answered until 1972 in 
United States v. United States District Court, popularly known as the 
Keith case.57 
                                                                                                                                     
52. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that no constitutional right was 
infringed upon by the wiretapping); Forgang, supra note 50, at 228 (noting the ability 
of federal agencies to use warrantless wiretaps in criminal and intelligence 
investigations); Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the 
Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1037 
(2008) (discussing how the FBI continued to use wiretapping surveillance after 
Olmstead). 
53. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (“The government agents 
here ignored the procedure of antecedent justification that is central to the Fourth 
Amendment, a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind 
of electronic surveillance involved in this case.”). 
54. Id. at 351 (holding that the Fourth Amendment grants a right to privacy 
against governmental intrusion); see Sloan, supra note 17, at 1493 (explaining that the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment are not only applied to specific places, but also 
to people and their reasonable expectations of privacy); Brown, supra note 12, at 197 
(“The Court relied on the reasoning that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and therefore the use of a listening device was deemed an unconstitutional 
search and seizure.”). 
55. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (discussing the erosion of past limitations on the 
application of the Fourth Amendment); Forgang, supra note 50, at 229 (describing the 
holding in Katz). 
56. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 n.23 (indicating that this case did not address 
national security cases); Sloan, supra note 17, at 1493 (“The unresolved question of 
warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes was addressed in the 
1972 case of United States v. United States District Court.”); David G Barnum, 
Warrantless Electronic Surveillance in National Security Cases: Lessons from America, 5 EUR. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 633, 655 (2006) (stating that this case did not address whether prior 
authorization would satisfy the Fourth Amendment because it was not a question 
presented in this case). 
57. See United States v. US District Court (Kieth), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (holding 
that judicial approval is required for domestic surveillance); see also Forgang, supra note 
50, at 233 (describing the Keith case and the Court’s decision about warrants for 
electronic surveillance); see also Robert Bloom & William J. Dunn, The Constitutional 
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In the Keith case, the Supreme Court reviewed a petition by 
the US Government for a writ of mandamus to compel a US 
District Court judge to disclose electronically monitored 
telephone conversations, which had been ordered collected by 
the US Attorney General, to protect national security.58 The 
Court restated its “deep seated uneasiness and apprehension” 
with the US Government’s ability to conduct secret electronic 
surveillance, even when the goal was to prevent terrorism.59 This 
case held that judicially-approved warrant procedures are 
necessary for the US Government to constitutionally conduct 
secret surveillance.60 The case, however, did not address what 
would be required when the US Government collected 
information about foreign powers or their agents.61 Instead, the 
US Supreme Court in the Keith case invited the US Congress to 
create legislation governing electronic surveillance.62 
3. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
In 1975 after the Keith case, the US Congress examined 
intelligence collection practices.63 Following the investigation, 
                                                                                                                                     
Infirmity of Warrantless NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of Presidential Power and the Injury to the 
Fourth Amendment, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147, 155 (2006) (describing the question 
of warrants reviewed in the Keith case). 
58. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 300 (citing the Attorney General’s affidavit in support of 
the government’s ability to conduct the surveillance and also citing the fact that the 
Attorney General approved the collection); see also Copeland, supra note 46, at 10 
(quoting the affidavit as stating collection was warranted, “to protect the nation from 
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the 
[US] Government”). 
59. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 312 (describing the feelings of the Court when making 
their decision); see also Copeland, supra note 46, at 10 (stating the Court’s reiteration of 
its uneasiness and apprehension). 
60. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 320 (describing that procedures are necessary for 
surveillance to be constitutional); see also Copeland, supra note 46, at 10 (affirming that 
the Keith case established that a warrant procedure with judicial approval is necessary 
for secret surveillance to be constitutional). 
61. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 308–09 (indicating that this case was about a potential 
attack by a domestic organization and did not involve foreign powers); see also Forgang, 
supra note 50, at 232 (describing the Court’s decision to narrow the scope of the case to 
domestic intelligence and not foreign intelligence). 
62. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 322 (“Congress may wish to consider protective standards 
for the latter.”); see also Copeland, supra note 46, at 10 (explaining that Justice Powell 
made the invitation to Congress to enact legislation regulating surveillance). 
63. See Church Committee Created, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/minute/Church_Committee_Created.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 
2014) (outlining the development of the Church Committee and its investigation into 
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Congress drafted  FISA.64 Congress enacted FISA in 1978 for the 
purpose of regulating the use of electronic surveillance in the 
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.65 FISA is the 
“primary vehicle” that allows the US Government to conduct 
electronic surveillance on individuals who are suspected of 
engaging in terrorist activities.66 FISA defines electronic 
surveillance as the acquiring of a communication, through 
intentional targeting, that was either sent or received by a US 
person and if the circumstances are such that the person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.67 
FISA provides a framework for US Government agency 
officials to follow when conducting electronic surveillance.68 A 
“guiding principle” of FISA is its regulation of the US executive 
power to conduct electronic intelligence by imposing a warrant 
application procedure.69 To obtain approval of a warrant from 
the FISC, an application must include the identity of the target, 
a certification that the target was a foreign power or agent of a 
                                                                                                                                     
intelligence practices); see also Forgang, supra note 50, at 233 (describing the actions 
Congress took to examine intelligence collection procedures); see also Bloom & Dunn, 
supra note 57, at 156 (noting Congress’ review of the appropriate protective standards). 
64. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c) 
(2012); see Forgang, supra note 50, at 233 (describing the congressional action that 
culminated in the passage of FISA). 
65. See Nathan C. Henderson, Note, The Patriot Act’s Impact on the Government’s 
Ability to Conduct Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 
179, 190 (2003) (discussing the legislative history of FISA); see also Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c)(2012)) at 3908 (1978) (“[While] [t]he Federal Government 
has never enacted legislation to regulate the use of electronic surveillance within the 
United States for foreign intelligence purposes . . . the Executive Branch and the 
Congress [recognize] that the statutory rule of law must prevail . . . .”). 
66. See Copeland, supra note 46, at 3 (describing FISA as the primary vehicle for 
surveillance provisions and its purpose); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i) (stating 
what surveillance may be conducted under FISA). 
67. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (internal quotations omitted) (defining electronic 
surveillance allowed under FISA). 
68. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1805 (outlining the appropriate procedures for 
conducting electronic surveillance); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 429 (stating that 
one purpose of FISA is to establish a framework for foreign surveillance); K. A. Taipale, 
The Ear of Dionysus: Rethinking Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 128, 
139 (2007) (describing FISA as a framework for the United States to conduct 
surveillance). 
69. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (providing the requirements for obtaining a warrant from 
the FISC); see also Forgang, supra note 50, at 233 (discussing the creation of FISA and 
the procedures within it); Copeland, supra note 46, at 15 (describing the warrant 
requirement in FISA). 
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foreign power, the type of surveillance to be used, and a 
certification that the information sought is for foreign 
intelligence purposes.70 
Under the 2008 Amendments to FISA, Congress clarified 
the procedures for conducting surveillance on US citizens 
abroad.71 Prior to these amendments, Executive Order 12,333 
provided the only governance for surveillance of US citizens 
living outside of the United States.72 These amendments 
clarified that the US Government cannot conduct surveillance 
on a US citizen living outside of the United States without a 
warrant.73 Ultimately, the 2008 FISA amendments ensured that 
US citizens living in the United States and outside of the United 
States are protected from electronic surveillance conducted by 
the US Government.74 
Warrants are not always required for electronic 
surveillance, however, and FISA provides procedures for the US 
Executive Branch to conduct warrantless surveillance for up to 
                                                                                                                                     
70. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c)(2012)) at 3943 (1978) 
(providing the procedures to obtain a court order); see Bedan, supra note 17, at 429–30 
(detailing what was required in FISA); cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2012) (describing what is 
required for warrant approval after the 2008 Amendments). 
71. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (naming additional procedures and changes to FISA); see 
also Forgang, supra note 50, at 237–38 (describing the changes made to FISA in 2008); 
Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and 
Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 297 (2009) (discussing the 
2008 FISA Amendments). 
72. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (1981) (outlining the procedures required for foreign intelligence information 
collection); see also Forgang, supra note 50, at 220 n.7 (stating that Executive Order 
12,333 was the law concerning surveillance of Americans abroad). 
73. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (“[The Government] may not intentionally target a 
United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States”); see 
also Forgang, supra note 50, at 236 (describing the changes made to FISA in the 2008 
amendments); see also Blum, supra note 71, at 300 (discussing the changes for US 
citizens living abroad). 
74. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(b)(1)–(3) (providing protections for citizens inside of 
the United States and outside of the United States); see also Forgang, supra note 50, at 
237 (determining that Congress created a procedure for protecting the privacy of all 
Americans subject to foreign intelligence surveillance); see also Blum, supra note 71, at 
300 (describing the efforts Congress took to protect citizens through FISA’s 
amendments). 
2014] I SPY WITH MY NOT SO LITTLE EYE 749 
one year.75 The US Executive’s ability to conduct warrantless 
surveillance is limited by numerous conditions.76 Included in the 
conditions is a requirement that warrantless surveillance only be 
conducted for foreign intelligence information.77 The targets of 
warrantless surveillance must be foreign powers or their agents.78 
In addition, there must not be a substantial likelihood that 
intercepted communications will involve a US citizen.79 
Although still limited, the ability to conduct warrantless 
surveillance was expanded by the 2008 FISA amendments.80 
Notably, the amendments allow an agency to conduct 
surveillance without a warrant while an appeal of a denied 
warrant application is pending.81 Therefore, FISA does have 
some limits on the US Executive’s power to conduct electronic 
surveillance without a warrant.82 
Outside of the 2008 FISA Amendments, the US Congress 
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (“the USA PATRIOT ACT”), and further 
                                                                                                                                     
75. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (explicitly outlining when a President can conduct 
surveillance without a court order); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 430 (reviewing 
what is required for the President to engage in warrantless surveillance). 
76. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (explicitly defining what must be certified under 
oath); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 430 (continuing to review and list out the 
requirements under oath). 
77. See 50 U.S.C § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i) (stating that the surveillance can only be 
conducted against a foreign power); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 430 (describing 
how surveillance can occur against a foreign power). 
78. See 50 U.S.C § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i); see also Bedan, supra note 14, at 430 
(reviewing the provisions for warrantless surveillance). 
79. See 50 U.S.C § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i); see also Bedan, supra note 14, at 430. 
80. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(c)(2) (stating, for example, that warrantless 
surveillance may occur if information important to national security will be lost); see 
also Forgang, supra note 50, at 237 (describing warrantless procedures under the 
amendments); Blum, supra note 71, at 299 (explaining the changes made for 
warrantless searches). 
81. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(i)(4)(B) (stating that surveillance may continue 
during appeal); see also Forgang, supra note 50, at 238 (noting continuation of 
surveillance during an appeal if a request is denied); Blum, supra note 71, at 304 
(indicating that surveillance will continue during appeals of warrant applications). 
82. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c)(2012)) at 3910 (1978) 
(“[FISA is] designed to permit the Government to gather necessary foreign intelligence 
information by means of electronic surveillance but under limitations and according to 
procedural guidelines which will better safeguard the rights of individuals.”); see also 
Henderson, supra note 65, at 190 (reviewing the legislative history of FISA). 
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expanded FISA.83 Notably, section 218 of the USA PATRIOT 
ACT changed the standard under which electronic surveillance 
may be conducted.84 Instead of requiring foreign intelligence to 
be the primary purpose of the search and surveillance, foreign 
intelligence simply needs to be a “significant purpose”.85 The 
USA PATRIOT ACT also authorizes the use of roving wiretaps, 
the ability to secretly surveil email communications, and the 
expanded duration for which a FISA warrant is valid.86  
FISA also created the FISC, an Article III special court that 
reviews warrant applications for foreign electronic surveillance.87 
Originally, the FISC consisted of seven judges who served for 
eleven-year terms.88 The FISC judges hail from different federal 
districts and are appointed by the Chief Justice of the US 
Supreme Court.89 Under the USA PATRIOT ACT, changes were 
                                                                                                                                     
83. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism  Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT 
ACT), Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) 
(changing the requirements for surveillance); see Copeland, supra note 46, at 18 
(discussing how the USA PATRIOT ACT makes significant changes to FISA 
procedures); Jennifer L. Sullivan, From “Purpose” to “A Significant Purpose”: Assessing the 
Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Under the Fourth Amendment, 19 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 379, 381 (2005) (describing the lower threshold 
for surveillance approval in the USA PATRIOT ACT). 
84. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. 
L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (amending “purpose” to “significant purpose”); 
Gehan Gunasekara, The ‘Final’ Privacy Frontier? Regulating Trans-Border Data Flows, 15 
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 362, 375 (2007) (noting the changes in section 218). 
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining the changes made to the 
purpose requirement of FISA). 
86. See Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required To Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism Act Of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), 
Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (establishing the use of roving 
surveillance); see Copeland, supra note 46, at 19–20 (discussing that roving wiretaps 
affect terrorists and potentially US citizens); see also Henderson, supra note 65, at 197 
(noting that prior to this change roving wiretaps were only available in the law 
enforcement context). 
87. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2012) (establishing the FISC and its internal workings, 
including the appointment of judges); see Henderson, supra note 65, at 190–91 
(reviewing the creation of the FISC and its structure). 
88. See § 1803 (noting the appointment of the FISC judges and their terms); see 
also Forgang, supra note 50, at 235 (explaining the creation of the FISC and the 
procedure for choosing judges). 
89. See § 1803(a)(1) (granting the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court the 
ability to appoint judges from different districts to the FISC); see also Bloom & Dunn, 
supra note 57, at 161 (describing the original composition of the FISC); see Sloan, supra 
note 17, at 1496 (reviewing the structure of the FISC). 
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made to the FISC including changing the number of the FISC 
judges from seven to eleven.90 
The FISC is designed to be a check on the US Executive’s 
power under FISA.91 Since FISA’s inception, however, the FISC 
has rejected very few applications for warrants.92 The FISC has 
allowed applications where the US Government seeks 
surveillance of a US citizen, and there is probable cause that the 
US citizen is an agent of a foreign power and suspected of 
terrorism.93 Essentially, the FISC only approves applications 
when the communications do not involve a US citizen, or when 
there is cause for conducting electronic surveillance against a 
US citizen.94 
4. The National Security Agency 
The NSA is the “primary” agency responsible for collecting 
and disseminating signals intelligence information in support of 
                                                                                                                                     
90. See Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required To Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism Act Of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), 
Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (amending provisions of FISA stating 
that the FISC will have seven judges to eleven judges); 50 U.S.C § 1803(a) (2010) 
(stating the new composition of the FISC); Copeland, supra note 46, at 21 (discussing 
the changes made to this court including the expansion of the number of judges); see 
also Henderson, supra note 65, at 197 (discussing the changes to the FISC after the 
Patriot Act). 
91. See Copeland, supra note 46, at 15 (describing the procedures in FISA that 
serve as checks on the President, including the FISC); see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, pt. 1 
(1977) (describing the internal and external checks on the US Executive). 
92. See Henderson, supra note 65, at 193 (noting that at the time of publication of 
that note only two warrant applications were rejected since FISA was enacted); see also 
Sloan, supra note 17, at 1496 (noting that between 1978 and 1999, the FISC approved 
11, 883 applications and denied none). 
93. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2) (requiring probable cause to believe that a person 
is an agent of a foreign power for a warrant to be approved); see also Taipale, supra note 
68, at 134–35 (noting that surveillance of US citizens can happen when the person is 
suspected of terrorism); Jonathan W. Gannon, From Executive Order to Judicial Approval: 
Tracing the History of Surveillance of U.S. Persons Abroad in Light of Recent Terrorism 
Investigations, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 59, 74 (2012) (reviewing FISA’s procedures and 
the probable cause requirement). 
94. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(B) (“[T]he President, through the Attorney 
General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order . . . if . . . there is 
no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any 
communication to which a United States person is a party . . . .”); see also Copeland, 
supra note 46, at 16–17 (explaining the express provisions of surveillance in FISA). 
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US military operations and foreign policy.95 The NSA’s mission 
is to protect US information systems by preventing access and 
producing foreign intelligence information.96 Executive Order 
12,333 permits the NSA to disseminate information to 
authorized government recipients, while prohibiting it from 
sharing intelligence with private corporations.97 
When surveillance is conducted outside the United States 
and US citizens are not involved, then there are few restrictions 
on the NSA’s surveillance activities.98 That said, any NSA effort 
to conduct electronic surveillance involving US citizens is 
subject to the strictures of FISA and Executive Order 12,333.99 
C. Privacy and Surveillance in New Zealand 
Part I.C.1 surveys the background of privacy legislation in 
New Zealand before the Privacy Act of 1993. Part I.C.2 discusses 
the development of the New Zealand Privacy Act of 1993. Part 
I.C.3 outlines the history of the GCSB and what laws apply to its 
actions. 
1. Privacy Legislation Prior to 1993 
Unlike in the United States, in New Zealand, the 
recognition of privacy as a legally protected right is a relatively 
                                                                                                                                     
95. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981) (to be codified at 3 
C.F.R. pt. 200) (“Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for 
signals intelligence activities . . .”); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 431 (noting that the 
NSA was given this “primary responsibility”). 
96. See Mission, NSA http://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/index.shtml (last visited 
November 10, 2013) (introducing the two parts of NSA cryptology as “Information 
Assurance” and “Signals Intelligence”); see also Brown, supra note 12, at 186 (laying out 
this “twofold mission” of the NSA). 
97. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, §2.3 (describing what 
information can be disseminated and retained by the NSA); see also Bedan, supra note 
17, at 431 (describing the inability of the NSA to share information with private US 
corporations). 
98. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 431 (noting that neither FISA or Executive Order 
12,333 prohibits this kind of conduct); see also Brown, supra note 12, at 198, (implying 
that warrants are required for US citizens but that no such requirements exist for non-
citizens). 
99. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (regulating the NSA’s actions 
outside of the United States); see also 50 U.S.C. 1801  (regulating NSA’s activities inside 
and outside of the United States). 
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new concept.100 The New Zealand Bill of Rights of 1990 does not 
include an express right to privacy.101 Article 21 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights, however, does protect against 
unreasonable searches of people, property, and 
correspondence.102 Unlike the US Constitution, the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights cannot be used to preempt or override 
other legislation.103 Besides the New Zealand Bill of Rights, the 
right to privacy is recognized in search and seizure cases and in 
tort law.104 Prior to the enactment of the New Zealand Privacy 
Act of 1993, some legislation restricted access to specific 
categories of personal information, such as health records.105 
In 1982, the Official Information Act was passed and 
granted New Zealanders access to all publicly held information 
unless there is good reason to withhold.106 While the Official 
Information Act was a step towards comprehensive privacy 
legislation, it only covers the right to access information held by 
                                                                                                                                     
100. See Vettoretti & Gunasekara, supra note 19, at 287 (noting that with the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights privacy law is developing); see also Cynthia Laberge, To 
What Extent Should National Security Interests Override Privacy in a Post 9/11 World? 1, 17 (3 
Victoria U. Wellington Working Paper Ser., 2010) (discussing that New Zealand law 
regarding privacy is recent). 
101. See generally Bill of Rights Act 1990 (N.Z.) (listing the rights of New Zealand 
citizens); see also Vettoretti & Gunasekara, supra note 19, at 292 (expressing the lack of 
a privacy provision). 
102. See Bill of Rights Act 1990, art. 21 (N.Z.) (granting the explicit right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure); see also Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 
73 (explaining the rights of Article 21 and privacy of correspondence). 
103. See Thomas Eichelbaum, The State of the Courts in New Zealand, 44 FED. LAW. 
29, 30 (1997) (stating that the New Zealand Bill of Rights is not supreme); see also 
David Erdos, Judicial Culture and the Politicolegal Opportunity Structure: Explaining Bill of 
Rights Legal Impact in New Zealand, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 95, 99 (2009) (affirming that 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights is not supreme). 
104. See Sam McMullan, Third Party Consent Searches Following the Search and 
Surveillance Act, 43 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 447, 450 (2012) (describing where the 
reasonable expectation of privacy is found in New Zealand laws and legislation); see also 
Hamed & Others v. R., (2011) NZSC 101 (utilizing the right to privacy in a tort case). 
105. See Health Act 1956, pt 1 sec 22(C) (N.Z.) (outlining disclosure procedures 
notably referencing the Privacy Act today); see also John M. Howells, The Privacy Act of 
1993: A New Zealand Perspective, 17 COMP. LAB L.J. 107 (1995) (describing existing 
legislation before the New Zealand Privacy Act). 
106. See Official Information Act 1982, pt 1 sec 4 (N.Z.) (granting the right to 
access of information); see also Howells, supra note 105, at 108 (outlining the 
implementation of the Official Information Act). 
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public organizations.107 After years of debate, the Privacy Act of 
1993 was enacted, providing comprehensive legislation to cover 
all forms of privacy.108 
2. New Zealand Privacy Act of 1993 
The New Zealand Privacy Act of 1993 codifies the general 
rules that govern privacy issues in New Zealand.109 The Privacy 
Act contains the basic principles relating to the information that 
is held by public and private registers.110 In addition, it sets 
guidelines and procedures for the matching programs run by 
agencies.111 A matching program compares the personal 
information of certain individuals to that of another group of 
individuals in order to verify information that may be used 
against an individual.112 
This Act is structured around twelve privacy principles.113 
The twelve principles are: (1) purpose of collection of personal 
information; (2) source of personal information; (3) collection 
of information; (4) manner of collection; (5) storage and 
security of personal information; (6) access to personal 
information; (7) correction of personal information; (8) 
                                                                                                                                     
107. See Official Information Act 1982, pt 1 sec 2 (N.Z.) (defining official 
information that can be obtained under the Act); see also Howells, supra note 105, at 
112 (indicating that the Official Information Act only pertained to the public sector). 
108. See Privacy Act 1993 (N.Z.) (covering all forms of personal information 
within its regulations). 
109. See European Commission, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. 
00665/11/EN. WP 182, Adopted on April 4, 2011 (stating that the Privacy Act of 1993 
is the main data protection legislation in New Zealand); see also Howells, supra note 
105, at 107 (discussing the background and development of the Privacy Act of 1993). 
110. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 7 sec 63 (N.Z.) (describing the practice of public 
registers); see also Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 74 (listing the fact that the Act 
provides principles relating to information held on public registers). 
111. See Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 74 (describing the privacy principles as 
part of the Act); see also Howells, supra note 105, at 112 (stating the purpose of the Act 
and then listing the principles). 
112. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 10 sec 97 (N.Z.) (defining an information matching 
program); see also Howells, supra note 105, at 119 (describing what a matching program 
is). 
113. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 1 (N.Z.) (defining the privacy principles in detail); see 
also Gehan Gunasekara & Erin Dillon, Data Protection Litigation in New Zealand: Processes 
and Outcomes, 39 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 457, 458 (2008) (mentioning that New 
Zealand uses twelve principles as well as some comparable States’ legislation); Howells, 
supra note 105, at 112 (outlining the twelve principles without explicitly stating that 
there are twelve). 
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accuracy of personal information; (9) length of time 
information can be held; (10) limits on use; (11) limits on 
disclosure; and (12) unique identifiers.114 These principles are 
based on the 1980 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) guidelines and the information privacy 
principles in Australia’s Privacy Act of 1988.115 These privacy 
principles form the core of the New Zealand Privacy Act (the 
“Privacy Act”).116 
All forms of personal information are protected in the  
Privacy Act, irrespective of the form that the information is in, 
or how it was collected.117 Further, when a foreign agency wants 
to conduct surveillance in New Zealand, the Privacy Act will 
apply.118 Overall, the Privacy Act is about data protection and the 
collection of personal information.119 
The Privacy Act also provides for the appointment of a 
Privacy Commissioner.120 The Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner (“the Office”) was created in 1991, prior to the 
enactment of the Privacy Act, which later codified the duties and 
                                                                                                                                     
114. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (providing details about the 
privacy principles and their contents). 
115. See OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, OECD (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-
guidelines.pdf (suggesting several principles for national application); see also Privacy 
Act 1988 (cth.) pt 3 div 2 (Austl.) (outlining the information principles that must be 
followed for information collection); Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 73 (discussing 
the development of the privacy principles); Gunasekara, supra note 84, at 367 
(discussing the OECD guidelines and stating that New Zealand has similar principles). 
116. See Vettoretti & Gunasekara, supra note 19, at 288 (describing the 
information privacy principles as the essence of the Privacy Act); see also Howells, supra 
note 105, at 113 (noting that the purpose of the Act was to create guidelines and that 
these principles act as those guidelines). 
117. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 2 (N.Z.) (stating that, with few exceptions, no 
personal information may be collected); see also Gunasekara, supra note 84, at 368–69 
(describing the protection of all forms of personal information in New Zealand). 
118. See Alan Toy, Cross-Border and Extraterritorial Application of New Zealand Data 
Protection Laws to Online Activity, 24 N.Z. U. L. REV. 222, 224 (2010) (noting that an 
agency in a foreign jurisdiction collecting information on New Zealand citizens still 
falls under the Privacy Act); see also Gunasekara, supra note 84, at 383 (explaining the 
applicability of these provisions to varying situations). 
119. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 11A s 114A (N.Z.) (indicating that the full title 
mentions protection of personal data); see also Gunasekara & Dillon, supra note 113, at 
458 (noting that New Zealand’s data protection statute is the Privacy Act). 
120. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 3 ss 12–14 (N.Z.) (identifying the role and functions 
of the Privacy Commissioner); see also Vettoretti & Gunasekara, supra note 19, at 287 
(discussing the Privacy Commissioner appointment). 
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appointment of the position.121 The functions of the Office 
include promoting the objectives of the Privacy Act and 
monitoring proposed legislation and government policies.122 
The Office must deal with privacy complaints in the first 
instance, and approve and issue codes of practice.123 
Additionally, the Office must authorize special exemptions from 
the information privacy principles, and review public sector 
information-matching programs.124 
The Privacy Act also sets up a means of dispute resolution 
that is outside of the New Zealand court system.125 A complaint 
citing a violation of a privacy right protected under the Privacy 
Act can be filed with the Privacy Commissioner.126 It is within the 
discretion of the Privacy Commissioner to investigate the 
violation once the complaint is filed.127 Even if an investigation is 
not undertaken, the Privacy Commissioner can attempt to seek 
settlement between the parties.128 The vast majority of privacy 
disputes are settled this way, avoiding the traditional court 
system.129 That said, disputes may be appealed to the New 
                                                                                                                                     
121. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 3 s 12 (N.Z.) (codifying the position of the Privacy 
Commissioner in the Privacy Act); see also Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 74 (noting 
that the position was created in a separate act); Howells, supra note 105, at 112 (noting 
the existence of the Privacy Commissioner Act). 
122. See Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 74 (explaining the functions of the 
Privacy Commissioner); see also Privacy Act 1993, pt 3 s 13 (N.Z.) (defining the duties 
and functions of the Privacy Commissioner). 
123. See Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 74 (stating that the role of the position 
involves reviewing complaints and issuing “codes of practice”); Howells, supra note 105, 
at 118 (describing the process for complaint review). 
124. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 3 sec 13 (N.Z.) (defining the duties and functions of 
the commissioner); see also Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 75 (explaining the 
functions of the Privacy Commissioner). 
125. See Gunasekara & Dillon, supra note 113, at 460 (describing the dispute 
resolution system and procedures); see Howells, supra note 105, at 116–18 (describing 
the complaint procedures). 
126. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 8 s 67 (N.Z.) (stating that complaints may be made to 
the Privacy Commissioner). 
127. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 8 ss 70–71 (N.Z.) (granting the Privacy Commissioner 
the ability to decide to investigate or not to investigate). 
128. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 8 s 74 (N.Z.) (providing that a settlement can be 
reached without an investigation). 
129. See Gunasekara & Dillon, supra note 113, at 462 (demonstrating by a review 
of annual reports that many claims are settled); see also Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, 
at 74 (giving an example of the number of complaints received in 1998 and noting the 
small amount actually getting a final disposition). 
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Zealand courts, though these courts rarely find that a violation 
of privacy rights has occurred.130 
Lastly, the Privacy Act allows for the sharing of information 
by certain government agencies.131 The Privacy Act allows for 
certain agencies in New Zealand to share information amongst 
them, but places limitations on information transferred outside 
of New Zealand.132 The Privacy Commissioner is granted the 
right to determine whether the transfer of information outside 
of New Zealand would violate any of the privacy principles.133 
One agency regulated by the Privacy Act is the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service (“NZSIS”), which is permitted to 
carry out electronic interceptions of information under the New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Act of 1969.134 Founded in 1956, 
NZSIS is an advisory organization that is charged with 
“obtaining, correlating, and evaluating” information relevant to 
New Zealand’s national security.135 The NZSIS is a civilian 
government agency that primarily collects information within 
New Zealand.136 The NZSIS does rely on warrants granted by the 
Minister to conduct surveillance, but may not obtain a warrant 
for conducting surveillance on a New Zealand citizen.137 While 
                                                                                                                                     
130. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 83 (N.Z.) (granting individuals the right to bring 
proceedings before the Human Rights Tribunal); see also Gunasekara & Dillon, supra 
note 113, at 463 (stating that some claims are appealed and noting the Tribunal’s 
willingness in only a few instances to find an interference occurred); see also Howells, 
supra note 105, at 118 (describing the complaint procedures). 
131. See Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 74 (describing the ability of certain 
agencies to share information); see also Privacy Act 1993, pt 9A s 96D (N.Z.) (stating 
that information agreements may be entered into by approved agencies). 
132. See Privacy Act 1993, pts 9A 11A (N.Z.) (describing the process for 
information sharing inside and outside of New Zealand). 
133. See Privacy Act 1993, pt 11A (N.Z.) (giving the Privacy Commissioner the 
right to make sure a determination). 
134. See Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 75 (describing what the NZSIS may 
do); see also NZSIS History, N.Z. SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERV., http://
www.security.govt.nz/about-us/nzsis-history/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (discussing the 
history of the NZSIS). See generally Intelligence Services Act 1969 (N.Z.) (providing for 
the regulation of the NZSIS). 
135. See David Collins, Spies Like Them: The Canadian Security Intelligence Service and 
Its Place in World Intelligence, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 505, 517–19 (2002) (recounting the role 
of the NZSIS); see also NZSIS History, supra note 134 (listing the duties of the NZSIS). 
136. See Collins, supra note 135, at 517 (describing the NZSIS as a civilian agency); 
see also Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 75 (explaining the role of the NZSIS as an 
intelligence agency). 
137. See Security Intelligence Services Act 1969, s 4A (N.Z.) (outlining the warrant 
procedures). 
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the NZSIS operates as a relatively transparent body, New 
Zealand operates another intelligence agency, the Government 
Communications Security Bureau (“GCSB”) that has recently 
come under scrutiny for its activities.138  
3. The Government Communications Security Bureau 
The GCSB created in 1977, is New Zealand’s intelligence 
organization responsible for intercepting foreign 
communications.139 The GCSB is subject to New Zealand law; 
however, specific exemption provisions are contained in 
legislation, such as the Privacy Act, the Public Finance Act, and 
the Radio Communications Act.140 Therefore, the GCSB, unlike 
the NZSIS, does not have to comply with provisions of the 
Privacy Act.141 
In early 2000, the first statutory framework was developed 
to govern the GCSB’s activities, the GCSB Act.142 In April 2003, 
the first version of the GCSB Act took effect.143 The GCSB Act 
defines the functions of the GCSB—and makes provisions for its 
administration and the conduct of its operational activities.144 
The original GCSB Act did have a warrant requirement for 
                                                                                                                                     
138. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (discussing the backlash that the 
GCSB has faced); see also Collins, supra note 135, at 519 & n.85 (comparing the GCSB 
and the NZSIS, and noting the GCSB’s efforts to become less secret since at least 2001). 
139. See Collins, supra note 135, at 519 (describing the role of the GCSB, its 
location, and creation date); see also Banisar & Davies, supra note 11, at 75 (noting the 
location of GCSB stations). 
140. See GOV’T COMM. SEC. BUREAU, http://www.gcsb.govt.nz [hereinafter GCSB 
website] (noting the applicability of privacy laws to GCSB); see also Privacy Act 1993, 
pt 6 s 57 (N.Z.) (exempting GCSB from its provisions). 
141. See supra notes 134, 140 and accompanying text (noting the application of 
the Privacy Act to the NZSIS but not GCSB). 
142. See GCSB website, supra note 140 (explaining that a statutory footing was 
needed for the GCSB); see also Laberge, supra note 100, at 111 (affirming that although 
the GCSB came into existence in 1977, a statutory framework was not created until 
2003). 
143. See GCSB website, supra note 140 (noting the date of enactment for the 
original version of the GCSB Act); see also Government Communications Security 
Bureau Act 2003 (N.Z.) (listing the date of assent as April 1, 2003). 
144. See GCSB website, supra note 140 (describing the key provisions of the GCSB 
Act and the functions of the GCSB); see also Government Communications Security 
Bureau Act 2003, pt 1 sec 3 (N.Z.) (describing the general purposes of the GCSB Act). 
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surveillance; however, the requirement made no mention of 
New Zealand citizenship as a restriction on surveillance.145 
The GCSB Act also has provisions that regulate warrantless 
surveillance.146 This portion of the Act does not allow for 
warrantless surveillance to be conducted on New Zealand 
citizens or residents, allowing this surveillance when a warrant is 
obtained.147 However, the GCSB Act does not place restrictions 
on the warrantless surveillance of non-New Zealanders.148 
4. Government Communications Security Bureau Act 
Amendments 
In 2013, the New Zealand legislature amended the GCSB 
Act and clarified the GCSB’s limitations, specifically clarifying 
that warrants are required to conduct surveillance on New 
Zealand citizens.149 The GCSB amendments added language that 
related to the surveillance of New Zealand citizens.150 Under the 
amendments, the GCSB can conduct surveillance on a New 
Zealand citizen or permanent resident, as defined in the GCSB 
Act with a warrant.151 Contrary to US laws, these New Zealand 
                                                                                                                                     
145. See Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, pt 3 sec 15 
(N.Z.) (describing the times when a warrant is required without mentioning 
citizenship); see also Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 
2013 (N.Z.) (describing the newest version of the GCSB Act’s additions including the 
specific mention of citizenship). 
146. See Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, pt 3 sec 16 
(N.Z.) (regulating warrantless surveillance conducted by the GCSB). 
147. See Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, pt 3 sec 15 
(N.Z.) (requiring that the GCSB always have a warrant for conducting surveillance on a 
citizen or resident of New Zealand). 
148. See Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, pt 3 sec 16 
(N.Z.) (making no mention of non-citizens in the prohibition of warrantless 
surveillance section). 
149. See Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013, 
pt 3 sec 15A–F (N.Z.) (describing the new warrant procedures). See generally 
Telecommunications (Interceptions Capability and Security) Bill 2013 (N.Z.), available 
at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2013/0108/5.0/DLM5177923.html 
(introducing other legislation at the same time as the new GCSB Act to change the 
surveillance law landscape in New Zealand). 
150. Cf. Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013, pt 
3 sec 15B–C (N.Z) (describing the exceptions for New Zealand citizens), with 
Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, pt 3 sec 15 (N.Z.) (citing 
language that does not create exceptions for New Zealand citizens). 
151. See § 15B (N.Z.) Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment 
Act 2013, pt 3 (describing the requirements for surveillance to be conducted on New 
Zealand citizens). 
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laws explicitly allow New Zealand authorities to conduct 
surveillance on New Zealand citizens in prescribed 
circumstances with a warrant.152 Although this seems to provide 
less privacy protection, the ability to conduct surveillance on 
New Zealand citizens, coupled with the required warrant 
application process, arguably affords New Zealand citizens 
better privacy protection than the United States affords its 
citizens.153 
Under the GCSB amendments, applications for warrants 
are made to the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
the New Zealand Commissioner of Security.154 The application 
may be approved if the proposed interception complies with 
one of GCSB’s named functions, the outcome justifies the 
interception, the outcome is not likely to be achieved by other 
means, satisfactory arrangements are in place to ensure that 
nothing beyond what is necessary is done and satisfactory 
arrangements are in place that the surveillance is reasonable.155 
The Minister can issue a warrant or an authorization subject to 
conditions that protect the public interest.156 
Under the New GCSB Act, the New Zealand Government 
may not intercept the private communications of a New Zealand 
citizen or permanent resident without a warrant.157 Just as in the 
previous version, a warrant is not necessary for the surveillance 
                                                                                                                                     
152. Compare Forgang, supra note 50, at 224 (noting that surveillance on US 
citizens is prohibited without a warrant unless the person is an agent of a foreign 
power), with Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013, sec 
15 (N.Z.) (describing the procedure for obtaining a warrant for surveillance of a New 
Zealand citizen). 
153. See Audrey Young, Key Pledges to Restrict Spy Agency’s Probe Rights, N.Z. HERALD 
(Aug. 16, 2013 5:30 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=
1&objectid=10913063 (describing the Prime Minister’s statements that he will restrict 
warrants); see also Audrey Young, GCSB Bill Passes After Final Reading, N.Z. HERALD 
(Aug. 21, 2013 7:49 PM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=
1&objectid=11112152 [hereinafter Young, GCSB Bill Passes] (noting that the Prime 
Minister reiterated that the warrant process has two steps and is about protection). 
154. See Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2013, pt 3 sec 15E(3) 
(N.Z.) (stating that an application must be made to the Minister of Foreign Affairs). 
155. See id., pt 3 sec 15A(2) (describing the components of an approvable warrant 
application). 
156. See id., pt 3 sec 15A(4) (noting that the Minister may approve any application 
subject to conditions that are in his view desirable to the public interest). 
157. See id., pt 3 sec 16 (noting the requirements for a surveillance to occur 
without a warrant). 
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of foreign individuals, with certain limitations.158 The 
intercepted communication must be to a foreign person or 
agency and must contain, or be expected to contain, foreign 
intelligence.159 
Further, the GCSB amendments contain a provision that 
regulates the warrant application and authorization process in 
urgent situations.160 This provision applies when the Minister is 
unavailable to assess a warrant application.161 The circumstances 
must make it absolutely necessary for a warrant to be 
immediately issued.162 Further, there must be a minimization of 
effects and reasonable efforts must be taken to prevent the 
interception of irrelevant communications.163 
These amendments also clarify the functions of the 
GCSB.164 The three main functions of the GCSB are information 
assurance and cyber security, gathering intelligence related to 
foreign persons and organizations, and assisting other New 
Zealand agencies such as the NZSIS.165 Previously, the goals were 
stated more broadly without separate subsections and only 
included gathering intelligence and assisting other agencies.166 
                                                                                                                                     
158. See id. (describing the limitations for surveillance on foreign individuals). 
159. See Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, pt 3 sec 16 
(N.Z.) (providing that the surveillance may occur without a warrant, but “does not 
authorize anything to be done for the purpose of intercepting the private 
communications of a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident of New Zealand”); see 
also Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013, pt 3 sec 16 
(N.Z.) (keeping intact the original provisions relating to warrantless surveillance). 
160. See Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013, 
pt 3 sec 19A (N.Z.) (describing the process for urgent warrant applications and 
approval). 
161. See id. (describing that the Attorney General, Minister of Defense or Minister 
of Foreign Affairs may then issue a warrant). 
162. See id. (noting that circumstances must be present such that the approval 
cannot wait until the Minister returns). 
163. See id. (noting that practical steps must be taken to ensure a minimization of 
effects); see also Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, pt 3 sec 24 
(N.Z.) (describing what minimization is required). 
164. See Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013, 
sec 7 (N.Z.) (noting a complete repeal of sections 7 and 8, and redefines the functions 
of the GCSB); see also Young, GSCB Bill Passes, supra note 153 (describing the bill and 
the changes that it makes). 
165. See Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013, 
sec 7 (N.Z.) (noting the three functions of the GCSB); see also Young, GSCB Bill Passes, 
supra note 153 (describing the redefined functions of the GCSB). 
166. See Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003, pt 2 sec 7 (N.Z.) 
(describing the major functions of the GCSB). 
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D. ECHELON: States Working Together 
While having separate intelligence agencies within their 
boundaries, the United States and New Zealand also work 
together when engaging in surveillance, as members of 
Echelon.167 Following World War II, the United States and the 
United Kingdom entered into the UKUSA Agreement, which 
created a cooperative alliance for international intelligence 
agencies.168 In the past, the term Echelon may have been used as 
a code word to describe the network of computers that 
processed communications after they were intercepted.169 
Today, Echelon is used generically to describe the system that 
the UKUSA members use to intercept and share intelligence.170 
The United States originally refused to acknowledge the 
existence of Echelon, but its existence has been confirmed in 
certain documents released by the NSA.171 The European 
Parliament has similarly released reports confirming Echelon’s 
existence.172 
                                                                                                                                     
167. See Brown, supra note 12, at 187 (listing the five countries that are known 
members of Echelon); Bedan, supra note 17, at 435 (mentioning the countries that are 
members of Echelon).  
168. See Early Papers Concerning UK-USA Agreement, 1940–1944, at 1, 7, 
available at http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/early_papers_1940-1944.pdf 
(presenting a clear affirmation that the British Government sought to enter into an 
information exchange agreement); Lawner, supra note 10, at 444 (recognizing that the 
United States and United Kingdom entered into the agreement following World War 
II); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 435 (noting the formation of the agreement after 
World War II). 
169. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 436 (suggesting that some evidence points to the 
idea that Echelon was used as a code word); see also Sloan, supra note 17, at 1468 
(noting that Echelon was a code word for the agreement). 
170. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 436–37 (noting the use of Echelon “generically” 
to describe the system of computers, satellites and cables that collect intelligence); see 
also Sloan, supra note 17, at 1471 (stating that Echelon refers to a system of intelligence 
collection involving telephones, email and fax). 
171. See Nat’l Sec. Agency, UKUSA Agreement Release 1940–1956, http://
www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/ukusa.shtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (providing 
access to early drafts of the agreement); see Bedan, supra note 17, at 436 (stating that 
the United States has never publicly acknowledged the existence of Echelon although 
there is “overwhelming evidence” that it exists). 
172. See European Parliament Report, A5-0264/2001 (reporting on the existence 
of Echelon and its capabilities); see also Lawner, supra note 10, at 452–53 (noting that 
the European Parliament released an official report acknowledging Echelon’s 
existence); Brown, supra note 12, at 190 (describing reports that have been released by 
the European Parliament). 
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Although the exact numbers are unknown, this global 
surveillance organization is capable of collecting a vast amount 
of information.173 It is a common belief that Echelon intercepts 
and analyzes nearly three billion communications every day.174 
The exact capabilities of Echelon are unknown, however, 
because of the classified nature of the program.175 The system is 
believed to intercept email, fax, and telephone 
communications.176 It links supercomputers throughout the 
world to accomplish this feat.177  
In the United States, there is a concern that Echelon allows 
the NSA to circumvent FISA and other laws to spy on US 
citizens.178 This system allows US agencies to receive the 
information from foreign agencies without questioning, or 
being involved in, how the information was obtained.179 On its 
face, the agreement appears completely legal by US 
constitutional and statutory standards because information 
sharing among countries is not regulated.180 US individuals, 
                                                                                                                                     
173. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 437 (noting that Echelon’s exact “scope of 
capabilities” is unknown); see also Brown, supra note 12, at 190 (noting that reports 
suggest Echelon’s ability to collect an “indiscriminately” large amount of information). 
174. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 437 (noting that it is a belief among researchers 
that Echelon can collect three billion communications a day); see also David Alan 
Jordan, Decrypting the Fourth Amendment: Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced 
Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice Over Internet Protocol, 47 B.C. L. REV. 505, 
512 (2006) (describing how Echelon collects three billion communications every day). 
175. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 437 (noting that the exact capabilities are 
unknown); see also Jordan, supra note 174, at 512 (noting that Echelon is only rumored 
to collect three billion communications per day). 
176. See Brown, supra note 12, at 185 (listing the types of telecommunications 
Echelon intercepts); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence 
Sharing, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 151, 173 (2011) (noting the types of communications 
collected). 
177. See Lawner, supra note 10, at 453 (describing the network of linked 
computers); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 438 (noting that supercomputers are 
linked at around twenty bases throughout the world). 
178. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 439 (noting the possibility of using NSA 
resources for Echelon’s use); cf. Brown, supra note 12, at 200 (stating that Echelon may 
appear to act illegally but actually works within a legal framework). 
179. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 439 (noting that US law allows for agencies to 
accept information from foreign agencies regardless of how it was obtained); cf. Brown, 
supra note 12, at 192 (arguing that once the information is in the United States it must 
comply with established law). 
180. Compare Brown, supra note 12, at 200 (reviewing applicable legal standards 
and concluding that Echelon meets those standards), with Lawner, supra note 10, at 
480 (stating that Echelon infringes on rights). 
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therefore, have less privacy when information is transferred 
among countries.181 
II. AMBIGUITIES, NEW LEGISLATION, AND SOLUTIONS 
In Part II, this Note will compare the changes in 
surveillance law in New Zealand and the United States, as well as 
each country’s recognition of Echelon. Part II.A will review the 
loopholes in current US surveillance law, with particular 
emphasis on the loopholes created by FISA. Part II.B will 
compare the current state of US law to the recent amendments 
to New Zealand’s GCSB Act. Specifically, Part II.B analyzes the 
Government Communications Security Bureau Act 
Amendments. Thus, this Part of the Note identifies and 
compares the problems in today’s surveillance law in two 
countries with storied histories of surveillance. 
A. The United States under FISA and Its Drawbacks 
In the United States, the current state of surveillance law is 
a product of FISA, its amendments, and its strictures. An 
evaluation of US surveillance law proves that inherent loopholes 
undercut FISA’s protections, which allows the US Government 
to circumvent privacy protections.182 The main problems are the 
insufficient definition of surveillance, the ability to spy on agents 
of foreign powers, the lack of protection against third party 
surveillance, and the ability to collect incidental information.183 
First, a significant loophole arises in the interpretation of 
the term “surveillance.”184 In order for information collection to 
                                                                                                                                     
181. See Toy, supra note 118, at 234 (noting that individuals have a harder time 
exercising privacy rights when information is transferred abroad). See generally Bedan, 
supra note 17 (arguing that Echelon does not protect rights). 
182. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 433 (reviewing the ambiguities and loopholes in 
FISA); see also FISA: A Law with Many Loopholes, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2013, http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/06/07/fisa-a-law-with-many-loopholes/ (describing the main 
loopholes of FISA). 
183. See infra notes 184, 188, 191, 195, 196 and accompanying text (outlining 
separate problems with FISA). 
184. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 433 (describing the definition of surveillance as 
falling into FISA’s loopholes); William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, 
Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the 
Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 157, 164 (1985) (describing definitions to be 
key in FISA). 
2014] I SPY WITH MY NOT SO LITTLE EYE 765 
be regulated by FISA, it must fall under FISA’s definition of 
surveillance.185 This definition does not apply to certain National 
Security Letters, which are secret authorizations for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to obtain records from 
telephone companies, credit agencies, and other organizations 
if they merely certify that the information is relevant to an 
international terrorism investigation.186 National Security Letters 
are regularly used to circumvent FISA’s warrant procedures.187 
Additionally, FISA’s definition of surveillance is antiquated 
because it distinguishes between data acquired inside of the 
United States and outside of the United States.188 This 
distinction allows the NSA to process surveillance that is 
received from other countries irrespective of whether the target 
is a US citizen.189 Therefore, the NSA is unrestrained when a 
communication is not physically intercepted within the United 
States.190 
Second, an issue arises when US citizens are construed to 
be agents of foreign powers under FISA because a warrant can 
be issued to engage in surveillance against them.191 According to 
                                                                                                                                     
185. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 433 (noting that if FISA is not implicated then 
the government may conduct surveillance in whatever way it wishes); see also Bloom & 
Dunn, supra note 57, at 164 (reviewing the definition of “agent” and how someone can 
fall within that definition). 
186. See Richards, supra note 10, at 1942 (clarifying the nature of National 
Security Letters); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 433 (noting the exclusion of certain 
letters from FISA); see also Andrew P. MacArthur, The NSA Phone Call Database: The 
Problematic Acquisition and Mining of Call Records in the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 441, 449–50 (2007) (defining 
National Security Letters and what information can be obtained as an alternative to 
FISA). 
187. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (describing how National Security 
Letters are used to get around FISA’s provisions).  
188. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 434 (noting the distinction between surveillance 
conducted inside the United States versus outside); see also Sloan, supra note 17, at 1501 
(noting that FISA does not apply when surveillance is conducted outside of the United 
States). 
189. See Brown, supra note 12, at 199 (describing how the NSA may receive 
information from other Echelon members); see also Sepper, supra note 176, at 173 
(stating that reports suggest that Echelon members use the system to exchange 
information about their citizens). 
190. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 434 (describing the situations that are not 
protected by FISA). See generally Forgang, supra note 50 (debating whether there is real 
protection for US citizens living abroad and FISA’s shortcomings). 
191. See Copeland, supra note 46, at 18 (labeling the definition of an agent of a 
foreign power as a “subtle exception” to FISA’s procedures); see also Blum, supra note 
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FISA’s procedures, the only way to spy on a US citizen is when 
they can be considered to be an agent of a foreign power, or 
engaged in information gathering, aiding, or abetting a foreign 
power.192 However, this limitation does not result in total privacy 
protection because it only requires probable cause that a person 
is an agent of a foreign power, not that a crime is being 
committed.193 The effect of this ability is that the US 
Government can conduct surveillance on a US citizen with no 
ties to terrorism such as a suburban mother telling her friend 
that her son “bombed” a school play.194 
Furthermore, FISA is limited to protecting against 
surveillance by the US Government; it does not create a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for individuals from 
surveillance by a third party.195 This rule is exploited by the 
United States’ participation in Echelon.196 Because US law 
generally does not regulate information sharing, the United 
States essentially violates the privacy rights of US citizens by 
accepting information from foreign intelligence agencies about 
potential threats involving US citizens.197 Thus, the lack of 
                                                                                                                                     
71, at 276 (describing what is required for a person to be considered to be an agent of 
a foreign power). 
192. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012) (defining an agent of a foreign power); see also 
Brown, supra note 12, at 198 (describing when surveillance can be conducted on a 
United States citizen). 
193. See Blum, supra note 71, at 291 (analyzing the probable cause requirement 
for determining when a citizen is an agent of a foreign power); see also Copeland, supra 
note 46, at, 27 (noting that the definition of agent of a foreign power combined with 
other factors creates the ability for average citizens to be spied on). 
194. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2) (defining an agent of a foreign power in a way 
that that allows for the inclusion of a US citizen within the definition); see Copeland, 
supra note 46, at 27 (noting that through the ambiguities in the definition of an agent 
of foreign power and the fact that the definition does not always rule out the US 
citizens from the definition, surveillance can occur on them); see also Ex-Snoop Confirms 
Echelon Network, CBS NEWS, Feb. 24, 2000, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-snoop-
confirms-echelon-network (retelling a story from a former spy about a mother who was 
listed as a possible terrorist because she said her son “bombed” a school play over the 
phone). 
195. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–42 (1976) (deciding that there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy for information revealed to a third party); see 
also Bedan, supra note 17, at 433 (reviewing the problems created by the lack of 
protection from surveillance by third parties). 
196. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (demonstrating the United States’ 
participation in Echelon). 
197. See Bedan, supra note 17, at 439, 444 (describing how a country can spy on 
US citizens and once a threat is discovered can give the United States that information 
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privacy rights when US citizens are spied on by agencies outside 
of the United States creates a loophole for spying on US citizens 
without the government restrictions created by existing law.198 
Lastly, US law allows for the collection of incidental 
information.199 It is predicted that Echelon collects nearly all 
communications, many of which can be considered incidental.200 
Therefore, the fact that FISA allows for the collection of 
incidental information suggests that privacy rights can be 
violated by its involvement in Echelon.201 
B. New Zealand: Impact of Recent Legislation 
 In New Zealand, the government defends the GCSB 
amendments, amid criticism that it promotes the “wholesale 
spying” on citizens.202 Opponents of these amendments argue 
that they are merely the product of major events in the 
international community, namely the surveillance practices in 
the United States.203 A recent poll has found that the majority of 
                                                                                                                                     
without FISA being implicated); see also Richards, supra note 10, at 1959 (stating that 
democratic societies should not allow secret surveillance). 
198. See Sloan, supra note 17, at 1505 (stating that the concept of incidental 
information should be reevaluated to determine whether it is still limited); see also 
Bedan, supra note 17, at 434 (noting the problems faced when information is held by 
third parties). 
199. See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d 
sub nom, In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 
2008) (allowing for the incidental collection of information of a person who was not a 
target of surveillance); see also Brown, supra note 12, at 192 (noting that incidental 
information about US citizens “may be retained and disseminated if the 
communication is in regard to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence”). 
200. See Sloan, supra note 17, at 1503 (discussing the incidental acquisition of 
information by Echelon); see also Brown, supra note 12, at 192. 
201. See Sloan, supra note 17, at 1505 (stating that the concept of incidental 
information should be reevaluated to determine whether it is still limited); see also 
Bedan, supra note 17, at 434 (noting the problems faced when information is held by 
third parties). 
202. See New Zealand Extends Domestic Spying Power, BBC ASIA (Aug. 21, 2013 6:49 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23769206 (quoting the Prime Minister as 
stating that the law is not about wholesale spying); see also New Zealand Passes Law 
Allowing Domestic Spying, AGENCE FR. PRESSE (Aug. 22, 2013), available at http://
www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-21/new-zealand-passes-spy-bill/4903500 (citing the 
Prime Ministers statements that the bill is not about wholesale spying). 
203. See Lee Jae-Won, New Zealand Rights Group Blasts New Law Extending 
surveillance powers, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2013, 3:48 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/22/us-newzealand-security-idUSBRE97L09S20130822 (stating that 
New Zealand is buying into the surveillance society being created); see also Rodney 
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New Zealanders are concerned about this new law because it 
looks like a means for unrestricted spying inside and outside of 
New Zealand.204 The Prime Minister in New Zealand, however, 
has publically lauded the amendments for creating a technically 
stricter and more proactive oversight regime than that in place 
prior to the Kim Dotcom scandal.205 Further, supporters suggest 
that the GCSB is undertaking important activities to protect the 
safety of this country despite the potential overreach of these 
amendments.206 The amendments make it clear that no 
surveillance may occur on citizens without a warrant.207 
Similar to the NSA in the United States, the GCSB is not 
restricted from engaging in information sharing.208 The GCSB is 
free to give information to agencies outside of New Zealand with 
no repercussion.209 Although New Zealand has a warrant 
requirement in place to conduct surveillance on citizens, the 
GCSB can get information from other agencies.210 
Even with the new amendments, New Zealand also remains 
a member of Echelon.211 New Zealand directly acknowledges a 
                                                                                                                                     
Harrison, Wholesale Spy Power is Precisely What GCSB Bill Means for Kiwis, N.Z. HERALD 
(Aug. 17, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_
id=1&objectid=10913479 (describing the new bill as creating a total surveillance state). 
204. See New Zealand Passes Law Allowing Domestic Spying, supra note 202 (noting a 
poll in which the majority of those polled were concerned about the changes); see also 
Isaac Davidson, Three-quarters of Kiwis Concerned about GCSB Bill, N.Z. HERALD (Aug. 21, 
2013, 1:54 PM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article. cfm?c_id=1&objectid=
11112107 (describing that a majority of those polled were at least somewhat concerned 
about the new law). 
205. See Quilliam, supra note 3 (noting when the law was passed); New Zealand 
Spying Law Passes Allowing Surveillance on Citizens, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 21, 2013, 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/21/new-zealand-spying-law_n_
3789041.html (describing the illegal government spying on Kim Dotcom).  
206. See New Zealand Passes Law Allowing Domestic Spying, supra note 2032 (noting 
that the Prime Minister thinks that the law is necessary because of the real and ever 
present threats to New Zealand); see also GCSB Bill Becomes Law, 3 NEWS (Aug. 21, 
2013), http://www.3news.co.nz/GCSB-Bill-becomes-law/tabid/1607/articleID/
310009/.aspx (describing the necessity of the law because the Prime Minister has 
encountered numerous risks to New Zealand’s security). 
207. See Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013, 
sec 16 (N.Z.) (stating that no surveillance may occur on a citizen without a warrant). 
208. See Privacy Act 1993, secs 11A, X (N.Z.) (prohibiting certain agencies from 
engaging in information sharing and exempting the GCSB). 
209. See id. (expressing no limitation on the GCSB for sharing information). 
210. See id. (lacking a prohibition on this type of activity). 
211. See Nathan Smith, The World of Signals Intelligence and GCSB in Context, NAT’L 
BUS. REV., http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/world-signals-intelligence-and-gcsb-context-ns-
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relationship with its UKUSA allies on its GCSB website.212 In 
addition to the website, a 1996 book written by a New Zealand 
investigative journalist provided extensive details about Echelon 
and New Zealand’s involvement in the program.213 The new law 
makes no mention or change to New Zealand’s ability to 
participate in Echelon or its effect on foreign and domestic 
surveillance in this country.214  
Therefore, the United States and New Zealand each have 
ambiguities and loopholes in their surveillance law. The United 
States and New Zealand are both members of Echelon and can 
circumvent their laws by sharing information with other 
countries. The question turns to whether these problems can be 
fixed. 
III. PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR POTENTIAL 
EFFICACY 
Part III reviews and critiques solutions proposed to resolve 
some of the issues surrounding surveillance law. This Part argues 
that as long as secret surveillance programs exist, new warrant 
requirements are simply not enough to protect the rights of 
citizens. Part III.A explores the various proposals for controlling 
international surveillance. The solutions are also analyzed for 
their viability. Part III.B argues that both the United States and 
New Zealand surveillance law systems are problematic. Overall, 
Part III demonstrates that irrespective of how the surveillance 
policy is framed, be it through public acknowledgement or 
public denial of a surveillance program, the violations to public 
policy that are created by membership in secret international 
programs create problems that cannot be easily solved by 
                                                                                                                                     
129503 (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (describing the ability of Echelon members to 
exchange information). See generally Government Communications Security Bureau 
Amendment Act 2013 (N.Z.) (making no mention of the GCSB’s involvement with 
Echelon). 
212. See GCSB website, supra note 140 (describing GCSB’s relationship with the 
UKUSA allies under the “About Us” tab). 
213. See NICKY HAGER, SECRET POWER, NEW ZEALAND’S ROLE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SPY NETWORK (1996); Bedan, supra note 17, at 436 (noting that the 
book exposed New Zealand’s involvement and Echelon generally); see also Sepper, 
supra note 176, at 162 (describing Nicky Hager’s book). 
214. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text (describing New Zealand’s 
involvement in Echelon). 
770 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:733 
adhering to either the United States’ or New Zealand’s 
methodology. 
A. Proposed Solutions to Control the Threats Posed by Surveillance and 
Why They Will Not Work 
Various solutions have been proposed to quell the debate 
surrounding surveillance and better protect privacy rights.215 
First, an international treaty that creates cross-border oversight 
of electronic surveillance could be implemented.216 Second, the 
proposed eradication of secret agencies would allow courts to 
review agency actions and reduce fear of surreptitious spying.217 
These potential solutions will not strike the appropriate balance 
between privacy and national security in the international 
community, specifically in the United States and New Zealand.218 
It is possible that a binding international treaty could be 
formed to protect information privacy.219 The European 
Directives regulating privacy could be used as guidance, notably 
the requirement that third parties have adequate protection 
before receiving or sending information.220 An opt-in provision 
has been proposed for an international treaty that would ensure 
that individuals know that their information is collected before 
action is taken.221 
                                                                                                                                     
215. See Gunasekara, supra note 84, at 391 (reviewing potential international 
solutions); see also Sepper, supra note 176, at 202 (suggesting implementation of a 
better law enforcement network); see also Henderson, supra note 65, at 208 (describing 
how the courts could act as a better check on the executive’s power in the United 
States). 
216. See Gunasekara, supra note 84, at 392 (describing an international solution); 
see also Wade, supra note 22, at 676 (proposing a treaty for data protection). 
217. See Richards, supra note 10, at 1959 (stating the problems with secret 
surveillance). But see Sloan, supra note 17, at 1510 (stating that systems like Echelon are 
necessary to protect against threats). 
218. See infra Part III.B (describing the problems with New Zealand and the 
United States’ surveillance systems). 
219. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (explaining that there is no reason 
to believe that an international treaty could not be implemented). 
220. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing EU directives and 
the ability to regulate third parties). 
221. See Wade, supra note 22, at 679 (discussing a potential opt-in provision for 
individuals); see also Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Borderless High-Technology Economies: 
Managing Spillover Effects, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 137, 137 (2002) (stating that opt-in rules can 
create a default presumption of data privacy). 
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There are notable problems with the implementation of an 
international treaty. Before a treaty could be agreed upon, 
agreement about how the right to privacy is recognized would 
need to occur.222 There are many definitions of privacy and 
finding a universally agreed upon definition may prove 
impossible.223 Different States protect these rights in quite 
distinct ways.224 An international treaty, furthermore, must 
account for the different ways that surveillance is conducted in 
countries in order for a treaty to be applicable to each state.225 
The creation of an international treaty, in other words, requires 
not merely an agreement upon one definitive interpretation of 
privacy, but also necessitates determining what the appropriate 
level of surveillance is, such that privacy is maintained while 
national security interests are protected.226 The viability of an 
international privacy treaty will turn on whether or not it can be 
enforced, an action that will prove difficult because there is no 
overarching system to enforce treaties.227 
Regarding the United States and New Zealand, past 
experiences with international conventions regarding privacy 
rights demonstrates that the United States is reluctant to join 
the international community in achieving this balance.228 
Notably, the United States has never ratified the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR, which is an attempt by the international 
community to enforce privacy law, and New Zealand waited over 
                                                                                                                                     
222. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining the lack of one agreed 
upon definition for privacy). 
223. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (stating that privacy is a complex 
value and it may not be possible to resolve debates around its definition). 
224. See supra Part I (reviewing the United Nations’ understanding of an explicit 
right to privacy, the United States’ implicit right to privacy, and New Zealand’s Bill of 
Rights establishing a right to privacy). 
225. See supra Part I.B–.C (explaining the ways that the United States and New 
Zealand protect privacy in clearly different ways); see also Wade, supra note 22, at 679 
(explaining that the goal a privacy protection treaty should be to balance interests). 
226. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing the lack of a universal 
definition of privacy). 
227. See UN 2010 Treaty Event, Towards Universal Participation and Implementation 
(2010), https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2010/Press_kit/fact_sheet_5_
english.pdf (“There is no over-arching compulsory judicial system or coercive penal 
system to address breaches of the provisions set out in treaties or to settle disputes.”). 
228. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (declaring that the United States 
has not signed the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR). 
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twenty years after it came into force to ratify it.229 Furthermore, 
an international treaty cannot regulate agencies that are not 
known to the public.230  
A second proposed solution would eliminate the ability for 
countries to run secret agencies.231 When programs are public or 
known, a court can review the legality of their plans without 
question.232 The opacity and deniability under which these 
networks operate insulate each intelligence agency from 
criticism and oversight.233 Agencies have worked together for a 
long time, sharing information and coordinating operations to 
address surveillance problems.234  When nations work together, 
there is a danger that the interests of one or more states may be 
detrimentally affected because not all state interests are 
adequately protected.235 Any attempt to completely eradicate 
secret surveillance agencies would be significantly challenging.236 
It is exceptionally difficult to eliminate a program whose 
existence is unknown.237 Sanctions could be imposed on 
countries that violate privacy rights, but is that enough to deter a 
                                                                                                                                     
229. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text (discussing the United States 
and New Zealand’s treatment of the Optional Protocol). 
230. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text (explaining that, due to the 
covert nature of Echelon, its capabilities are unknown); see also Richards, supra note 10, 
at 1934 (describing how a secret program cannot be reviewed until made public). 
231. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (introducing the idea that secret 
programs must not be allowed). 
232. See Richards, supra note 10, at 1959 (stating that only when something is 
public can the court review it); see also Sepper, supra note 176, at 169 (describing the 
lack of democratic oversight for the secrete programs). 
233. See Sepper, supra note 176, at 168 (identifying the ease of the agencies to 
deny their actions); see also Bedan, supra note 17, at 440 (noting the claim that Echelon 
is used to spy on citizens and the NSA may not control all information that is 
disseminated). 
234. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (explaining that Echelon was 
founded after World War II which ended almost seventy years before the time this Note 
was written). 
235. See Sepper, supra note 177, at 172 (noting that liberties of some nations are 
detrimentally affected by countries sharing information); cf. Brown, supra note 12, at 
199 (describing how a secret agency like Echelon can fall within legal bounds because 
the participants do not conduct surveillance on their own citizens). 
236. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty inherent 
in implementing treaties). 
237. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (stating how difficult it is to review 
agencies whose existence is unknown). 
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country from trying to protect its national security interests?238 If 
countries were forced to eliminate these programs, they would 
have to handle even more court review of, public inquiry into, 
and international scrutiny concerning their surveillance 
programs than already occurs, threatening their efforts to 
maintain security within their borders.239  
B. Why the US and New Zealand Surveillance Systems are Problematic 
The surveillance laws currently in force in the United States 
and New Zealand are riddled with ambiguous language and 
various loopholes enabling exploitation of intended 
protections.240 To some extent, each country allows its 
surveillance agencies to spy on its citizens.241 The main 
difference between the two countries is that the United States 
publically denies that the US Government conducts surveillance 
of its citizens, denying warrants for surveillance against these 
individuals though they may be spied on regardless of this 
pronouncement.242 Contrarily, New Zealand blatantly allows 
warrants to be obtained for surveillance against citizens.243 These 
seemingly opposite structures have the same result—citizens of 
each country are the object of government surveillance and 
privacy intrusions.244 
The United States and New Zealand are also known 
members of Echelon, the secret surveillance program created 
after World War II.245 Echelon provides a loophole through 
                                                                                                                                     
238. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (stating that the European Court of 
Human Rights places sanctions on states that violate their laws). 
239. See supra notes 4, 5, 9 and accompanying text (explaining the international 
scrutiny that the United States and New Zealand currently face as well as an example of 
a Court review of surveillance). 
240. See supra Part II.A–.B (reviewing the potential ambiguities and loopholes in 
US and New Zealand law). 
241. See Part II.A–.B (discussing the ability of each country to collect information 
on their citizens). 
242. See supra Part I.B–.C (describing the surveillance law in New Zealand and the 
United States). 
243. See Part I.B–.C (noting that the United States does not allow warrants to be 
approved for surveillance on citizens, whereas New Zealand does). 
244. See supra Introduction (showing evidence that the United States and New 
Zealand spy on their citizens). 
245. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (recognizing when the agreement 
was formed). 
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which each country can avert its own surveillance law 
framework, specifically the warrant requirement.246 Further, the 
warrant requirement in each nation is undercut by the ability to 
engage in information sharing.247 Neither the NSA nor the 
GSCB is prohibited from sharing information with or receiving 
information from outside agencies.248 Therefore, even strict 
warrant requirements for surveillance on citizens will not 
prevent an agency from getting information about citizens.249  
The above distinction further highlights the similar 
problems that these two countries face even while on the surface 
their surveillance structures may appear quite dissimilar.250 
Echelon allows the United States, whose law does not allow for 
approval of warrants to conduct surveillance on its citizens, to 
work with other countries to gain information.251 Further, the 
recent amendments in New Zealand to the GCSB were enacted 
with the intention of enhancing transparency of the GCSB’s 
actions.252 By maintaining a membership in Echelon, New 
Zealand is diminishing its transparency by engaging in secret 
intelligence gathering with other countries.253 As threats of 
international terrorism continue to prevail, it is unlikely that 
either country will willingly abstain from participating in this 
international surveillance agency.254 
                                                                                                                                     
246. See supra Part II (outlining the problems caused by Echelon in the United 
States and New Zealand). 
247. See supra notes 180, 227 and accompanying text (noting that the NSA and 
GCSB are allowed to engage in information sharing). 
248. See supra notes 180, 227 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra notes 180, 227 and accompanying text (describing how information 
sharing works outside of the established surveillance system). 
250. See supra Part I.B–.C (recognizing the differences between the United States 
and New Zealand). 
251. See supra note 179 (establishing that Echelon allows the United States’ 
Government to circumvent established procedures). 
252. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that the Prime Minister 
has lauded the amendments as creating a more proactive structure). 
253. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text (describing New Zealand’s 
relationship with Echelon). 
254. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (listed New Zealand and the 
United States). 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States and New Zealand have comprehensive 
legislation concerning privacy and surveillance. Although the 
scope of surveillance deemed legal differs between the 
countries, both require warrants to protect their citizens against 
unwarranted searches. Despite these protections, each country’s 
laws are effectively circumvented at times through information 
obtained from international surveillance affiliates, and other 
legal loopholes. Both the United States and New Zealand are 
members of Echelon, and, thus, may circumvent their domestic 
laws. Therefore, overarching international protection of these 
rights—the systems in place in the United States and New 
Zealand—although different, offer the same amount of 
protection to citizens from surveillance: little to none. 
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